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COMPETITION AND MARKET FAILURE IN THE
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE
STEVENS
Alan J. Meese*
The brochure for this excellent conference opined that Justice John Paul
Stevens has been "vigilant in enforcing the Antitrust Laws." This is not
necessarily high praise, at least if one equates "vigilant" with "aggressive."
Where antitrust is concerned, such vigilance is not always a good thing.
Indeed, for several decades, the "vigilant" enforcement of the Sherman Act'
by courts and enforcement agencies destroyed wealth and made consumers
and society worse off. During this so-called "inhospitality era," agencies
challenged and courts banned any number of non-standard contracts, all on
the ground that such agreements reflected the exercise of market power
2
harmful to rivals and consumers.
More recently, courts and the enforcement agencies have internalized
new developments in economic theory. These developments suggest that
contracts once deemed universally harmful are usually efforts to reduce
"transaction costs"-that is, the costs of relying upon an unbridled market
to conduct economic activity. Where restraints do reduce transaction costs,
they eliminate or mitigate "market failure"-that is, the allocation of
resources different from that which a well-functioning market would
produce.
This Essay examines the role Justice Stevens has played in facilitating
the transition from the inhospitality era to the modern era, in which courts
afford non-standard contracts far more generous treatment than they once
did. Justice Stevens played a significant role in generating doctrine which
recognized that "perfect competition" is not always a valid foundation for
antitrust policy. In particular, this doctrine, influenced by Justice Stevens,
recognized that non-standard contracts-admittedly departures from perfect
competition-could in some instances facilitate, and not retard, the sort of
useful competition that takes place in the real world. More precisely, such
contracts could overcome market failure by better aligning and perfecting
the incentives of the parties to them.
* Ball Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. J.D., University of Chicago;
A.B., College of William and Mary in Virginia. Special thanks to Jeffrey Bourne and Brian
Hennelly for research assistance, and to Dana Otey for assistance in preparing the
manuscript.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
2. See infra notes 29-31.
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Part I describes the so-called inhospitality tradition of antitrust law and
the vision of (near) atomistic competition that drove it. That tradition, as
Part I shows, reached its zenith just before Justice Stevens joined the
Supreme Court. Part II examines Justice Stevens's role in helping to undo
this tradition, focusing on his crucial vote in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc. 3 and his influential opinions in National Society of
ProfessionalEngineers v. United States4 and NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma.5 All three decisions recognized that
contractual restrictions on atomistic rivalry can overcome market failures
and thus enhance the welfare of consumers and the rest of society. Part III
examines several questions still left open, despite these and other decisions,
including the purely doctrinal scope of the per se rule, the methodology for
conducting rule of reason analysis, and the exact definition of cognizable
benefits the assertion of which will avoid summary condemnation of a
restraint.
I. PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE INHOSPITALITY TRADITION

Everyone agrees that the Sherman Act should protect and enhance
"competition." According to Justice Louis Brandeis, for instance, the true
test of legality under § 1 of the Sherman Act is whether a challenged
restraint merely "regulates" and thus "promotes" competition, or instead
destroys it, to the detriment of consumers and the rest of society. 6 More
recently, courts and agencies have characterized § 1 analysis as involving
an inquiry into whether a contract is "anticompetitive," "procompetitive,"
or both. 7 If an agreement produces both effects, then the question is
whether there are less restrictive means of producing the benefits and, if
8
not, which effect predominates.
Courts might ask and answer these questions in a vacuum, relying solely
upon their own intuition or instinct about the competitive impact of a given
restraint. However, over the years, courts have taken a different approach,
relying, expressly or implicitly, upon economic theory to interpret the
causes and consequences of trade restraints. 9 Thus, while the correlation is
3. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
4. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
5. 468 U.S. 85 (1985).
6. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); see also Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (explaining that courts, when implementing
Section 1, should determine whether a challenged agreement places an "undue limitation on
competitive conditions").
7. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations
Among Competitors § 1.1 (2000) [hereinafter DOJ Antitrust Collaboration Guidelines].
8. See id. §§ 3.36-3.37; see also Cont'l TV., Inc., 433 U.S. at 59 (finding that courts
should analyze intrabrand restraints by balancing benefits to interbrand competition against
harms to intrabrand competition); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).
9. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law 1836-1937, at 268 (1991)
("One of the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an
'economic approach' to antitrust problems only in the 1970's. At most, this 'revolution' in
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dominant economic theory have
by no means perfect, antitrust doctrine and
0
generally moved in the same direction.1
If the Sherman Act requires courts to consider the impact of a restraint on
"competition," and if courts pay particular attention to economic theory,
then one might expect courts to equate antitrust "competition" with the sort
of "competition" most familiar to economists-that is, "perfect
competition." After all, when it exists, perfect competition produces the
II
optimal allocation of resources and thereby maximizes society's welfare.
Given its rigor, the perfect competition model could provide
straightforward advice to courts-namely, ban each and every practice that
contravenes one or more assumptions of the perfect competition model. In
this way, it might be said, courts could make the economy as "competitive"
as possible and thus facilitate the optimal allocation of resources.
In point of fact, courts have over the years declined to embrace perfect
competition as the sole guide to antitrust policy. After all, the world of
perfect competition is very strange indeed. For one thing, in true perfect
competition, there are no firms. 12 Bargaining and information costs are
nonexistent, and individuals-not firms-allocate resources by continuous
bargaining with each other. 13 Moreover, because there are no bargaining
costs, information costs, or other obstacles to movement of resources, such
allocation occurs in an instant, without any intervention of time. 14 Indeed,
most contracts offend this model, as they constrain actors and thus prevent
15
the instantaneous movement of resources from one use to another.
Finally, the model explicitly excludes fraud and other forms of predatory
6
conduct. '
To ensure "perfect competition," then, courts would have to radically
expand the reach of antitrust regulation. For instance, courts would have to
ban business firms, finding that such economic integration entails
antitrust policy represented a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has been forged
by economic ideology since its inception."); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative
Foundationsof Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 219, 226 (1995) ("In almost every era
of antitrust history, policymakers have employed economic models to explain or modify the
state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement.").
10. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003

U. Ill. L. Rev. 77, 124-44 (documenting a correlation between changes in economic theory
and the scope of antitrust regulation under § 1).
11. See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 85-86 (1921).
12. See id. at 76-87 (describing assumptions and operation of the perfect competition
model without regard to firms).
13. See id. at 81-82.
14. Id.; Frank M. Machovec, Perfect Competition and the Transformation of Economics
(1995).
15. Knight, supra note 11, at 77 (noting that in perfect competition there is "perfect
mobility" in all economic adjustments).
16. See id.at 78 ("We formally exclude all preying of individuals upon each other.").
This "formal" assumption usually follows from the assumption of perfect knowledge. See id.
at 78-79; George J.Stigler, The Theory of Competitive Price 22 (1942) (explaining that
complete knowledge obviates the need for regulation of fraud and the like).
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cooperation that thwarts the complete mobility of resources and absolute
bargaining discretion. 17 Under this approach, a partnership and the
resulting price-fixing between two former law school classmates would
offend § 1.18
A merger between the two smallest firms in an
unconcentrated market would elicit equal hostility. Finally, courts would
have to ban all covenants not to compete, no matter how reasonable and
how limited in time and scope. 19
Even so-called "vertical" restraints would not escape the policy of the
"atomistic competition"-only model. While vertical restraints generally do
not entail cooperation between rivals, they nonetheless constrain the
movement of resources and thus violate the "no obstacle" assumption of
perfect competition. 20 In short, true enforcement of perfect competition
would require courts to forbid most economic cooperation, thereby
21
exploding society into individual atoms.
While courts have never enforced perfect competition as such, they came
closest to doing so during a four-decade period in the twentieth century.
During this period, courts banned numerous forms of partial contractual
integration on the grounds that such agreements were "anticompetitive" and
lacked any redeeming virtues. 22 In the end, courts drew a distinction
between "competition on the merits," on the one hand, and concerted
action, on the other. 23 The former took the form of so-called unilateral
conduct, such as innovation, the realization of economies of scale, and the
like. 24 The latter included exclusive dealing contracts, tying contracts,
17. See Knight, supra note 11, at 77 (finding perfect competition to rest upon the
assumption that individuals "own themselves" and act independently of other individuals).
18. Cf Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) ("When two partners set the
price of their goods or services they are literally 'price fixing,' but they are not per se in
violation of the Sherman Act.").
19. Cf United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 566-68 (1898) (noting that the
Sherman Act does not ban "ordinary contracts and combinations," including partnerships
and covenants not to compete, that make commerce possible).
20. See Alan J. Meese, Market Failureand Non-StandardContracting: How the Ghost
of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. Competition L. & Econ. 21, 75 (2005)
(explaining how non-standard contracts constrain movement of resources and thus
contravene assumptions of perfect competition); cf Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (explaining how exclusive dealing contracts supposedly create a "clog
on competition").
21. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(explaining that consistently enforced competition would "make eternal the bellum omnium
contra omnes and disintegrate society so far as it could into individual atoms"); Polk Bros. v.
Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) ("The war of all
against all is not a good model for any economy. Antitrust law is designed to ensure an
appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all economic actors to
compete full tilt at every moment.").
22. See Meese, supra note 10, at 124-34.
23. See Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 Minn.
L. Rev. 743, 772 (2005).
24. See id. at 797-808 (describing judicial definition of "competition on the merits").
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minimum and maximum price maintenance, and the like. Courts and
scholars embraced the former conduct as necessary to realize technological
efficiencies derived from engineering considerations. 25 A classic example
involved the integration of iron making and steel making to achieve thermal
economies. 26 By contrast, courts and scholars saw no good purpose for
partial contractual integration. 27 Moreover, because such integration
usually reduced rivalry or made market entry more difficult, courts and
scholars presumed that such restraints were manifestations of market
power. 28 Thus, such restraints were all harm and no benefit.
For most of the twentieth century, then, courts used antitrust law to
enforce a somewhat modified version of perfect competition. Whereas the
most rigorous versions of the model treated the individual as the basic unit
for analysis and thereby assumed no function for "the firm," courts and less
rigorous economists treated "the firm" as the most basic building block,
thereby portraying the firm as a single, unilateral actor. 29 Courts allowed
such firms to compete "on the merits" and to grow so as to account for a
nontrivial share of the market, under the theory that such growth would be
the result of significant (technological) efficiencies. 30 The result was the
31
so-called "inhospitality tradition" of antitrust law.

25. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass.
1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (distinguishing between "competition based on pure
merit," on the one hand, and contractual exclusion, on the other).
26. See, e.g., Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization 381 (1968); Joel B. Dirlam & Alfred
E. Kahn, Fair Competition: The Law and Economics of Antitrust Policy 23 (1954); Carl
Kaysen & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis 120-21
(1959); F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 70 (1970).
27. See Meese, supra note 10, at 115-34.
28. See Meese, supra note 20, at 80-83.
29. See, e.g., Joe S. Bain, Pricing, Distribution and Employment: Economics of an
Enterprise System 10 (1948); Kaysen & Turner, supra note 26, at 8 (referring to
"competitive firms").
30. See Meese, supra note 23, at 779-82.
31. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 19 (1985)
(describing the inhospitality tradition of antitrust); id. at 370-73 (describing the influence of
the inhospitality tradition on antitrust treatment of non-standard contracts); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 705, 715 (1982) ("[The]
'inhospitality tradition of antitrust' . . . called for courts to strike down business practices that
were not clearly procompetitive. In this tradition an inference of monopolization followed
from the courts' inability to grasp how a practice might be consistent with substantial
competition. The tradition took hold when many practices were genuine mysteries to
economists, and monopolistic explanations of mysteries were congenial. The same tradition
emphasized competition in the spot market. Long-term contracts, even those arrived at by
competitive processes, were deemed anticompetitive because they shut off day-to-day
rivalry."). The phrase "inhospitality tradition" apparently was coined by Professor Donald
Turner, an economist who headed the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in the
1960s. According to Professor Turner, "I approach territorial and customer restrictions not
hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law."
Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. St. B.A. Antitrust L. Symp. 1, 1-
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Justice Stevens joined the Court in 1976, during the heyday of the
inhospitality tradition. Under the law as it stood then-and still stands
now-contracts were unlawful per se if they were "always or almost always
anticompetitive" 32 and always or almost always lacked any redeeming
virtue. 3 3 Applying this framework in light of the state of economic learning
at the time, courts had banned any number of non-standard contracts.
Tying arrangements were unlawful per se, so long as the defendant sold a
differentiated product or otherwise possessed a modicum of market
power. 34 Minimum resale price maintenance and exclusive territories were
unlawful per se, without regard to competitive effect. 35 In 1968, the Court
went even further, holding that maximum resale price maintenance 36was
unlawful per se, even if the practice resulted in lower consumer prices.
Each of these doctrines furthered "competition" in some sense, by
voiding restraints that constrained firms' freedom of action.3 7 These
decisions made the world look more like that imagined by the perfect
competition model. 3 8 However, these decisions could not eliminate all
obstacles to perfect competition, such as bargaining costs, information
costs, and opportunism. In the end, these decisions caused the allocation of
resources to diverge from the hypothetical result which true perfect
competition often might produce. After all, each of these condemned
practices at least potentially reduced the cost of transacting and thus
potentially eliminated or attenuated market failure. In fact, it might be
argued that such restraints could make market results more competitive
39
rather than less so.
One decision in particular illustrates the welfare-reducing impact of
inhospitable per se rules: United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.40 In
Topco, the defendants-several small grocery chains-formed a joint
venture to manufacture and distribute private label products for sale in the

2; see also Jacobs, supra note 9, at 227-28 (describing the so-called "Harvard School of

industrial organization" and antitrust policy during this period).
32. See Meese, supra note 10, at 94.
33. Id. at 94-95; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
(articulating this test for per se illegality).
34. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-48 (1962) (finding that the
possession of a copyright raises the presumption of market power sufficient to establish a per
se tying violation).
35. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Sandura, 61 F.T.C.
756 (1962).
36. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
37. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (finding that a primary
dealing contract between a manufacturer and less than one percent of a market's dealers
conflicted with the "central policy" of the Sherman Act "against contracts which take away
freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market"); N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 10 (tying
agreements interfere with competition on the merits).
38. See Meese, supra note 10, at 124-34.
39. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
40. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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respective chains' stores. 4 1 The parties adopted certain restrictions
ancillary to the venture. Most notably, the venture assigned venture
members exclusive 42territories in which they, and only they, could sell the
private label brand.
Judge Hubert Will of the Northern District of Illinois presided at trial.
Applying the rule of reason, he found that the restrictions did not harm
competition and most likely advanced it.43 In some markets, the member
chains had one percent shares of the market. 44 In others, they had sixteen
percent. 45 The national average was six percent.4 6 Moreover, the venture
itself allowed the chains to create and market the same sort of private label
products so familiar at national chains. 4 7 At the same time, Judge Will
credited testimony to the effect that the venture partners would not have
created the venture or promoted the venture products without the assurance
of exclusive rights to distribute the venture product in their home
competition
territories. 48 Thus, he concluded, the restraints likely enhanced
49
between small, regional chains and larger, national chains.
Today, the Seventh Circuit would have heard the appeal.50
Unfortunately, the case went directly to the Supreme Court, which reversed.
The Court did not question any of Judge Will's factual findings or his
ultimate conclusion that the venture and related restraints would actually
enhance rivalry between regional and national chains and thus enhance the
welfare of consumers. Instead, the Court held that these considerations
were not relevant to the task of determining whether the challenged
41. Id. at 598.
42. Id. at601.
43. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1038-43 (N.D. Ill. 1970),
rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
44. Id. at 1033.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1032-33, 1035-36.
48. See id. at 1040-43.
49. See id. at 1043 ("Whatever anti-competitive effect these practices may have on
competition in the sale of Topco private label brands is far outweighed by the increased
ability of Topco members to compete both with the national chains and other supermarkets
operating in their respective territories. . . . Only the national chains and the other
supermarkets who compete with Topco members would be benefited [if the government
prevailed]. The consuming public obviously would not.").
50. In 1972, appeals by the United States in antitrust cases went directly to the Supreme
Court, thereby bypassing courts of appeal, pursuant to the then-present version of the
Expediting Act of 1903. See 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). In 1974, Congress amended 15 U.S.C. §
29 to make it much more difficult for the United States to bypass the courts of appeal in this
manner. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 29 (West 1997). Under current law, the United States can only
bypass a court of appeals if: (1) the district court certifies that the immediate consideration of
the appeal by the Supreme Court is "of general public importance in the administration of
justice" and (2) the Supreme Court decides, in its discretion, to hear the appeal. See id. §
29(b). The Supreme Court is very reluctant to exercise this discretion in favor of
entertaining such an appeal. See, e.g., Microsoft v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000)
(rejecting the request of the United States to bypass the D.C. Circuit and take up the appeal
directly from the district court).
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restraints contravened the Sherman Act. 5 1 According to the Court, the only
relevant consideration was the restraint's impact on "intrabrand" rivalrythat is, rivalry in the sale of the venture product. 52 By itself, this limitation
contravened the Sherman Act, which the Court called the "Magna Carta of
free enterprise," by depriving the venture partners of their "freedom" 53
to
compete in the sale of Topco-brand products how and where they wished.
Thus, the Court rejected the defendants' argument that the restraints'
positive impact on interbrand competition was a "redeeming virtue" of the
sort that obviated per se condemnation. 54 Indeed, the Court expressly held
that Judge Will's detailed analysis of the restrictions' impact upon overall
competition was really beside the point. 55 Once the government proved
that the restrictions hampered intrabrand rivalry, the case was over: Courts
should not inquire whether such contractual departures from atomistic
rivalry enhanced overall competition by encouraging venture members to
invest in the promotion of Topco products. 56 The Court even suggested that
the restraint's impact on a noneconomic value-the "freedom" of traders
from contracts they had entered-helped tip the balance in favor of per se
treatment. 57 The result flowed naturally from prior precedent, notably
United States v. Sealy, Inc, which had summarily condemned similar
58
restraints that had accompanied unlawful price fixing.

51. Topco, 405 U.S. at 610-11.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 609-10.
54. Id. at 607, 609-11; see also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (explaining
that identification restraint's possible redeeming virtue prevents per se condemnation).
55. Id. at 609 ("Whether or not we would decide this case the same way under the rule
of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant .... ).
56. See id. at 609-11. It should be noted that Judge Hubert Will had expressly found that
the exclusive territories ancillary to the venture were necessary to induce each venture
partner to vigorously promote Topco products in its own territory. See Topco, 319 F. Supp.
1031, 1040-43 (N.D. Il1. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Absent such restraints, each
member would have attempted to develop its own private label product, thus destroying the
benefits of collective production and distribution. See id. at 1040. Moreover, in the Supreme
Court, the defendants expressly argued that territorial exclusivity was necessary to prevent
venture members from free riding on each others' efforts. See Brief for Topco Associates,
Inc. at 22-23, Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (No. 70-82). The brief cited Professor Robert Bork's
path-breaking argument that exclusive territories ancillary to otherwise valid horizontal
integration could enhance interbrand competition and thus consumer welfare. Id. at 33; see
also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 430-38 (1966).
57. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 610 (characterizing the Sherman Act as a "Magna Carta of
Free Enterprise" that help enhance the "freedom" of individual traders to sell as they saw fit);
see also Meese, supra note 10, at 132-34 (explaining how inhospitality-era decisions
incidentally furthered noneconomic values such as the "freedom" of economic actors from
contracts they entered).
58. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
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II. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS, MARKET FAILURE, AND JUSTICE
STEVENS

The inhospitality approach to antitrust provoked a revolution in economic
thought in the form of transaction cost economics ("TCE"). 59 Practitioners
of TCE recognized that, in the "real world," without contractual integration,
numerous assumptions of the perfect competition model simply do not
obtain. There are various obstacles to the movement of resources,
information costs are positive, and parties sometimes seek to take advantage
of one another via fraud or less overt forms of opportunism. Thus, reliance
upon an entirely unconstrained "spot" market to allocate resources will
often result in a "market failure"-that is, an allocation of resources that is
less than optimal. 60
Put another way, an individual's decision to
"transact"-that is, conduct economic activity "on the market"--comes at
'6 1
what economists have dubbed a "transaction cost.
There are two possible solutions to such market failures: First, the state,
acting as an omniscient central planner, can direct the allocation of
resources so as to replicate the results of perfect competition. 62 Second,
individual actors can adopt contractual devices that reduce the cost of
63
relying upon unbridled atomistic rivalry to conduct economic activity.
The firm itself is such a device, whereby employees agree to obey the
directions of the firm's owner within certain limits. 64 By empowering
owners to direct the activities of their employees, the institution of the firm
lowers the cost of a given economic activity and thus enhances society's
65
welfare.
The firm is not the only mechanism for reducing the cost of transacting in
the market. Innumerable instances of partial contractual integration can
achieve the same result. 66 For instance, a firm that relies upon the market
(dealers) to distribute its product may fear that individual dealers will
59. See Timothy J. Muris, Improving the Economic Foundationsof Competition Policy,
12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 11-23 (2003).
60. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integrationof Production: Market Failure
Considerations,61 Am. Econ. Rev. 112 (1971).
61. See Williamson, supra note 31, at 16-22.
62. See Paul A. Samuelson, Economics 743 (1951) (arguing that examination of pricing
and allocational decisions in a hypothetical socialist economy "teaches us how to appraise
the mechanical efficiency of pricing in a non-socialist society").
63. See Williamson, supra note 31, at 17 (outlining the thesis that the "economic
institutions of capitalism have the main purpose and effect of economizing on transaction
costs"); R H. Coase, The InstitutionalStructure of Production,82 Am. Econ. Rev. 713, 71617 (1992) (explaining that many contractual devices are designed to reduce the cost of
transacting).
64. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).
65. See id.at 390-91.
66. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 356 (1980); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford &
Arman A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
ContractingProcess,21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978).
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possess inadequate incentives to promote the manufacturer's product, given
the prospect that one dealer may "free ride" on the promotional efforts of
another. 6 7 Manufacturers may attempt to overcome this free riding and
ensure adequate promotion by imposing minimum resale price maintenance
or granting dealers exclusive territories, thus ensuring that dealers can
68
recoup their expenditures on promotion.
To be sure, both complete and partial integration of the sort just
described offend certain assumptions of the perfect competition model, and
thus apparently render the economy less "competitive" than it otherwise
might be. As noted earlier, a law firm partnership reduces "competition"
that might otherwise take place between the partners, thereby offending the
model's "no cooperation" assumption. 69 At the same time, restrictions
ancillary to the partnership, including non-compete agreements, can hinder
the movement of resources, and thereby offend the model's assumption that
resources move costlessly from one user to another. 70 Exclusive territories
are equally destructive of (perfect) competition. Such restraints entail a
form of cooperation between potential rivals and also constrain dealers'
71
investment decisions.
Still, even though such restraints contravene one or more assumptions of
the perfect competition model, they may still enhance welfare. 72 By
reducing the cost of transacting, such restraints may overcome market
failures and thus facilitate a more efficient allocation of resources. 73 As
Professor Ronald Coase once noted, restrictions that are inexplicable to the
neoclassical economist may be necessary for "bringing about a competitive
74
situation."
Justice Stevens helped lead the Supreme Court away from the
inhospitality tradition and toward an approach to § 1 more consistent with

67. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ.
86 (1960).
68. See Bork, supra note 56, at 429; Telser, supra note 67, at 89-96.
69. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
72. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1984) ("A
'competitive market' is not necessarily the one with the most rivalry moment-to-moment.
The auction in which atomistically small buyers and sellers continuously shout out bid and
asked prices, the picture of 'perfect competition' found in economic texts, is a hypothetical
construct. Every market entails substantial cooperation over some domain in order to
facilitate competition elsewhere. Every firm has webs of internal cooperation. Exxon
entails far more coordination than the average cartel. Every joint venture, every partnership,
indeed every contract creates cooperation among people who might otherwise be rivals.
Markets themselves are organized.").
73. See Meese, supra note 10, at 136-41; Muris, supra note 59, at 18-19.
74. See R. H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposalfor Research, in Policy Issues
and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization 67-68 (V. Fuchs ed., 1972); see also
F. A. Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, in Individualism and Economic Order 92, 96
(1948).
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the underlying premises of the rule of reason. 75 Three decisions earlier in
his tenure are of particular note--one where the Justice provided the
deciding vote, and two in which he authored the majority opinion.
76
The first case, of course, is Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.
There, the Court reconsidered the per se rule against non-price vertical
restraints it had announced just a decade earlier in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co. 7 7 A California jury had awarded $590,000 to the victim of
78
a location clause-the damages were then trebled to over $1.7 million.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had reversed,
distinguishing Schwinn on very creative grounds. 79 Justice Stevens was one
of three initial votes for certiorari; Justice Lewis Powell's persistent
lobbying produced a fourth in Justice Potter Stewart.80
Only eight Justices participated in Sylvania.81 Two voted to reverse the
Ninth Circuit and reaffirm Schwinn in its entirety. 82 A third voted to affirm
by distinguishing but reaffirming Schwinn.83 This left five possible votes
for reversing Schwinn in its entirety: Chief Justice Warren Burger, and
Justices Powell, Stewart, Harry Blackmun, and Stevens. All five voted to
reverse Schwinn in its entirety, and Justice Powell authored the opinion for
this majority.
Sylvania rejected at least two foundational principles of the inhospitality
tradition. First, the Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs argument that
the restraint's impact on the autonomy of dealers was itself a relevant
consideration when deciding whether to apply the per se rule. 84 Second, the
decision expressly rejected the plaintiffs argument that any departure from
unbridled competition rendered a restraint unlawful per se, without regard
to its ultimate impact on welfare. 85 Instead, the Court explained how, in
some situations, pure competition would result in suboptimal expenditures

75. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (stating that the
Sherman Act only forbids restraints that are "unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions"); see also Meese, supra note 10, at 83-89 (explaining how Standard Oil was
consistent with earlier case law).
76. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
77. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
78. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Cont'l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1976), affid,
433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
79. See id at 988 (finding a location clause entered by a small firm was not unlawful per
se).

80. Andrew I. Gavil, Sylvania and the Process of Change in the Supreme Court, 17
Antitrust 8, 9 (2002).
81. Justice William Rehnquist recused himself. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.
82. See id. at 71 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 59-71 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Schwinn should
not apply when the manufacturer imposing the restraint lacks market power).
84. See id. at 53 n.21.
85. See id. at 52-59 (rejecting the contention that contractual reduction in intrabrand
competition would itself suffice to establish a per se violation).
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on promotion of a manufacturer's product. 86 Intrabrand
restraints, the
87
Court said, could thus improve upon "pure competition."
Taken to its logical conclusion, Sylvania could have remade antitrust
law. 88 Still, one decision could not transform the entire body of § 1
jurisprudence. Indeed, the opinion itself carefully limited its ruling to
vertical restraints, distinguishing Topco as a case involving horizontal
conduct. 89 The opinion narrowed itself even further, limiting its holding to
non-price vertical restraints, thus leaving the ban on vertical intrabrand
price-fixing thoroughly intact. 90
It was left to Justice Stevens to extrapolate Sylvania so as to apply its
principles more generally. In National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v.
United States, the Justice authored the definitive modern statement on the
rule of reason and the proper scope of per se rules. 9 1 There, the United
States challenged ethical rules forbidding competitive bidding by members
of a professional association. 92 The rules were always or almost always
"anticompetitive" in the sense relevant to per se analysis, as they reduced
price competition between rival engineering firms. 93 Thus, the challenged
94
rules plainly satisfied the first part of the two-part test for per se illegality.
Nonetheless, the defendants sought to introduce evidence at trial that
purported to show that competitive bidding would produce shoddy
86. See id. at 55 ("Because of market imperfections such as the so-called 'free rider'
effect, these [promotional] services might not be provided by retailers in a purely
competitive situation.").
87. Id.at 55-56.
88. See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev.
171.
89. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 n.27 (distinguishing Topco as a case that involved a
"horizontal restriction among ostensible competitors"). In a fascinating study of the
"judicial history" of the Sylvania decision, Andrew Gavil reports that Justice Stevens
initially expressed concern that overruling Schwinn would require application of the rule of
reason in cases like Topco as well, because one could not "'differentiate bet[ween] vertical
& horizontal agreements."' See Gavil, supra note 80, at 9 (quoting papers of Justice Lewis
Powell). In the end, however, the Justice joined Justice Powell's opinion, after the latter
added several changes "in the final opinion to assure his vote." See id.at 9-10. Professor
Gavil does not explain what these changes were, but one can speculate that they included the
language that narrowed the rationale to apply only to vertical, non-price restraints.
90. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18. As Justice Byron White pointed out in his
concurrence, however, the economic logic invoked by the Sylvania Court would also require
application of the rule of reason to minimum and maximum resale price maintenance. See id.
at 69-70 (White, J.,concurring in the judgment). Still, as noted in the text, the Court took
great care to disclaim any such intent.
91. Nat'l Soc'y ofProflEng'rs,435 U.S. 679 (1978).
92. Id.at 681.
93. Id. at 692-93 (explaining how, "[o]n its face, this agreement restrains trade within
the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act"); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se
Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 Geo. L.J. 165, 177
(1988).
94. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (holding that "pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue" renders conduct per se unlawful).
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engineering work and thereby threaten public safety. 95 The district court
excluded the evidence, prompting an appeal. The Sylvania decision
intervened, and the defendants relied upon that decision and other canonical
rule of reason decisions in their brief, contending that the trial court had
96
improperly excluded evidence of redeeming virtues.
The Court rejected this claim in an opinion by Justice Stevens. Given the
precedent "on the books," the Justice could have dismissed the defendants'
argument in a few short paragraphs intoning about the restraint's horizontal
purpose and effect-citing Topco.9 7 Indeed, the restraint seemed even
more pernicious than that in Topco, involving as it did a price restraint
among most participants in the industry. Instead, Justice Stevens offered a
lengthy exegesis of the rule of reason, furthering the Court's retreat from
the inhospitality tradition.
The opinion began by essentially rejecting perfect competition as a guide
to rule of reason analysis: According to Justice Stevens, although the
Sherman Act states that "every contract that restrains trade is unlawful,"
this cannot be taken literally. 98 If it were, then § 1 "would outlaw the entire
body of private contract law" and thus prevent "competitive markets-indeed, a competitive economy-[from] function[ing] effectively." 9 9 In the
real world, then, contracts that restrain the freedom of action of contracting
parties can actually further useful competition and thus enhance economic
welfare.
Instead of implementing perfect competition, Justice Stevens announced
that § 1 bans only unreasonable restraints.10 0 In so doing, Stevens endorsed
and rehabilitated Standard Oil, a decision that was much-maligned when
decided and often ignored during the inhospitality era. 10 1 The Court in
Standard Oil, it will be recalled, had construed the Sherman Act narrowly
10 2
in light of the statute's potential interference with liberty of contract.
95. See Nat'l Socy ofProflEng'rs,435 U.S. at 681.
96. See id.at 686-87 (recounting defendants' reliance upon Sylvania, Chicago Board of
Trade, and StandardOil).

97. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608-11 (1972) (declining to
consider benefits of a restraint that reduced intrabrand competition).
98. Nat'l Soc"y ofProf'lEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 687.
99. Id.at 688.
100. Id. at 691.
101. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also William Letwin,
Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust Act 265-70
(1965) (describing the outcry that followed StandardOil).
102. See Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 59-60; see also Meese, supra note 10, at 83-89
(explaining how Standard Oil and previous decisions construed the Sherman Act so as not to
interfere with liberty of contract). Some scholars have claimed that Standard Oil departed
from the holding of earlier decisions. See, e.g., Rudolf JR. Peritz, Competition Policy in
America, 1888-1992: History, Rhetoric, Law 56-58 (1996). Chief Justice William Howard
Taft persuasively rebutted this claim. See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 460-61
(1927) (arguing that Standard Oil simply reaffirmed principles announced in Joint Traffic
and Addyston Pipe); William Howard Taft, The Anti-Trust Act and The Supreme Court 8995 (1914) (same). I have argued elsewhere that, in fact, the approach taken in StandardOil
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The Standard Oil decision itself pointed out that binding contracts were
necessary to further trade, and that interference with reasonable agreements
would stultify trade, contrary to the overarching purpose of the Act. 10 3 This
was so even if the restraint was horizontal. Indeed, according to Justice
Stevens, the paradigmatic example of a "reasonable" restraint was a
covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale of a business. 10 4 Such
covenants, he said, would certainly eliminate horizontal rivalry between
firms that would otherwise compete. 10 5 Nonetheless, any short-run
reduction in competition between horizontal rivals was more than
outweighed by economic benefits resulting from the "long-run benefit of
enhancing the marketability of the business itself." 106 Put another way,
such horizontal agreements reduce rivalry so as to perfect the owner's
property rights in the business it hopes to sell, thereby enhancing the
07
owner's incentives to build up the business in the first place. 1
At the same time, Justice Stevens rejected the defendants' effort to justify
their ban on competitive bidding under Standard Oil's rule of reason.
Simply put, the supposed benefits of the restriction on price competitionenhanced public safety and increased quality-were not the sort of virtues
courts should consider when conducting a rule of reason analysis. 10 8 After
all, the Court said, the sole focus of rule of reason analysis, as articulated by
the Standard Oil decision, was on a restraint's impact on "competitive
conditions."' 1 9 Thus, the rule of reason would not credit a claim that
competitive conditions themselves produced results inconsistent with the
public interest and were thus unreasonable; consumers in a competitive
market could presumably perform their own assessment of any trade-off

is entirely consistent with prior case law, which also construed the Sherman Act in light of
liberty of contract. See Alan J. Meese, Liberty andAntitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L.
Rev. 1, 43-67 (1999) (showing that early decisions construed the Sherman Act in light of
liberty of contract).
103. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911) (noting that the
Standard Oil Court exercised "the duty to interpret which inevitably arose from the general
character of the term restraint of trade [which] required that the [term] restraint of trade
should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract and
render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate
commerce"); StandardOil, 221 U.S. at 58-62.
104. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688-89 (discussing Mitchel v.
Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711)).
105. See id. at 689.
106. See id.
107. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade: A Legal and
Economic Analysis 252-53 (1986) (explaining how covenants ancillary to the sale of a
business can create more complete property rights in the business being sold); Coase, supra
note 74, at 67-68.
108. See Nat "lSoc 'y of Profrl Eng'rs,435 U.S. at 693-96.
109. See id at 690, 692 ("[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint.").
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between price and quality. 1 10 Under the Sherman Act, one could not reduce
competition for the mere sake of producing market outcomes different from
those that a "competitive" market would produce. "'
The Professional Engineers opinion elaborated and expanded upon
Sylvania in three important ways. First, as noted earlier, Sylvania limited
its analysis to vertical non-price restraints.11 2 By contrast, the logic of
Professional Engineers, including its willingness to consider claims that a
restraint produces cognizable benefits, encompassed both vertical and
horizontal restraints. Indeed, as just explained, the opinion invoked, as a
paradigmatic case, a horizontal restraint in the form of a covenant not to
compete with rivals. 1 13 Such a restraint could be reasonable, it was said,
because it encouraged the formation of businesses in the first place."1 4 By
its terms, then, Professional Engineers contemplates that proponents of
horizontal restraints can avoid per se condemnation if they adduce a
plausible claim that the restraint will have a positive impact on "competitive
conditions."
Second, Professional Engineers reiterated and solidified Sylvania's
rejection of the use of noneconomic values to give content to the Sherman
Act. 115 While some had characterized Sylvania's position on this score as
dicta, such an interpretation of ProfessionalEngineers is not plausible. 116
After all, the defendants adduced a claim that their restriction on
competition furthered the public interest by enhancing public safety.
Justice Stevens rejected this claim because the rule of reason, as articulated
in StandardOil, only recognized arguments about the economic impacts of
challenged restraints. 117 The Court characterized Sylvania in the same
manner, emphasizing that the Sylvania Court had focused on "competitive

110. See id.at 695 ("Petitioner's ban on competitive bidding prevents all customers from
making price comparisons in the initial selection of an engineer ....It is this restraint that
must be justified under the [r]ule of [r]eason, and petitioner's attempt to do so on the basis of
the potential threat that competition poses to the public safety and the ethics of its profession
is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.").
111. See Krattenmaker, supra note 93, at 178 n.80, 179 (explaining how Professional
Engineers and subsequent decisions stand for the proposition that arguments "such as the
claim that reasonable prices were substituted for unreasonable market-determined prices,
are per se inadmissible").
112. See supra note 89; see also Cont'l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53
n.21 (1977).
113. See Nat'l Soc'y ofProf'l Engrs,435 U.S. at 688-89.
114. See id.
at 689.
115. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
116. See William B. Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints:

Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and Sylvania, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 461, 495-96
(1979).
117. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 690 n.16. It should be noted that the
Court's characterization of Standard Oil was entirely correct. See Meese, supra note 10, at
83-89 (detailing how Standard Oil bans only those restraints that produce "monopoly or its
consequences," i.e., higher prices, reduced output, or reduced quality).
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impact" and "economic analysis" throughout the opinion. 118 The Sherman
Act was no longer a Magna Carta that implemented trader freedom without
regard to economic consequences.119
Third, the ProfessionalEngineers opinion reiterated Sylvania's embrace
of transaction cost reasoning in the § I context, to the exclusion of the
perfect competition that had formed the basis of the inhospitality tradition.
Here again, Justice Stevens placed the specific results of Sylvania onto a
more general footing, pointing out that, in the real world, competition
required the existence and enforcement of all manners of restraining
commercial agreements. 120 In so doing, he echoed or anticipated the
conclusions of leading figures in the transaction cost school, without the
sort of technical jargon that could give some scholars and practitioners
pause. 121
To be sure, the invocation of "competition" to rebut the defendants'
argument that "competition was itself unreasonable" seems to echo Topco
and other inhospitality era decisions. At the same time, the logic of Topco
would have ipso facto precluded the consideration of any purported
justification for the restraint on competitive bidding. Moreover, Justice
Stevens did not question Sylvania, but instead invoked the decision as
identifying the sort of redeeming virtues that would justify a restriction on
unbridled competition. 122 According to Justice Stevens, then, a restraint
could both reduce moment-to-moment rivalry and at the same time further
overall useful "competition." Thus, when read properly, Professional
Engineers allows defendants to escape per se condemnation by adducing a
plausible argument that, absent the restriction, one or more departures from
the assumptions of perfect competition would lead unbridled rivalry to

118. See Nat'l Soc "yofProflEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691 n.17.
119. Cf United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (holding that the
Sherman Act was a "Magna Carta" of free enterprise and thus banned contractual restrictions
on the "freedom" of firms to sell where they wished).
120. See Nat'l Soc 'y of Profl Eng'rs,435 U.S. at 688.
121. See Coase, supra note 63, at 716-17 (stating that firms adopt various commercial
practices to reduce the cost of relying upon the market); see also R.H. Coase, The Finn, The
Market, and The Law, in The Firm, The Market, and the Law 8-9 (1988) (explaining that
commodity exchanges and similar "perfect" markets are constructed by private contracts and
legal rules, both enforced by the State); Easterbrook, supra note 72, at 1 (explaining that socalled "perfect competition" often depends upon horizontal cooperation to create and police
markets); F.A. Hayek, "Free'"Enterprise and Competitive Order, in Individualism and
Economic Order, supra note 74, at 110-16 (contending that well-functioning competitive
order depends upon a properly designed "legal framework" of contract, property, tort, and
business law); Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization? 26 (UC
Berkley Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 37, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractid=255624 (distinguishing between "institutional
environment (or rules of the game)" and "the institutions of governance (or play of the
game)," the latter of which parties can alter by contract).
122. See Nat'l Soc "yofProfl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691 n. 17.
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produce a market failure. 123 In these circumstances, unbridled atomistic
competition is unreasonable, and contractual restrictions that combat the
market failure can have a positive impact on "competitive conditions."
As if there was any doubt, Justice Stevens reiterated these points six
24
years later in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.1
There, some universities challenged the National Collegiate Athletic
Association's ("NCAA's") limitations on the output and price of televised
college football, claiming that these horizontal restrictions were unlawful
per se. 12 5 There was, of course, significant precedent supporting this
26
argument.1
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens rejected the claim that each and
every horizontal restriction on price or output is unlawful per se. Justice
Stevens conceded that certain precedents, including Topco, could be read to
ban any horizontal restriction on price or output, regardless of asserted
benefits. 127 Nonetheless, invoking Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox, he
pointed out that horizontal cooperation was an indispensable element of
certain productive ventures between otherwise independent firms. 128 Sports
leagues, he said, were such a venture. Though nominally comprised of
numerous independent teams, these leagues could not function without
numerous horizontal agreements on essential elements such as rules and
scheduling.' 29 This cooperation was even more critical where amateur
leagues were concerned, as these leagues required cooperation between
rivals to preserve the amateur character of the rivalry in question. With
respect to college sports, this meant agreements regarding the academic
qualifications of players both before and after their admission, as well as
agreements on the maximum level of compensation that schools could pay
such players for their services.1 30 Without such cooperation, Justice
Stevens said, "collegiate" sports would rapidly degenerate into
semiprofessional sports, analogous to minor league baseball.' 31
Having explained why cooperation between NCAA members could be
beneficial, Justice Stevens invoked Sylvania's conclusion that a restriction
on competition in one portion of the marketplace could actually enhance
overall competition. 132 The same logic could apply in this horizontal
123. See Krattenmaker, supra note 93, at 178-79 (stating that under Professional
Engineers and similar decisions, a plausible assertion that a restraint will produce nonpecuniary cost savings obviates per se condemnation); Meese, supra note 10, at 95-98.
124. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
125. Id. at 94-95.

126. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
127. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 n.17, 99 nn.1819, 100 n.20 (1985).
128. Id. at 101 (relying upon Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 278 (1978)).
129. See id. at 101-02.
130. See id.
131. See id.

132. See id. at 103.
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context. 133 To be sure, no party before the Court was challenging the
various NCAA rules that maintained college football as an amateur
endeavor. Nor did the Court actually approve these restrictions. Still,
Justice Stevens found that the fact that some of these horizontal agreements
were necessary to make an admittedly legitimate venture function also
meant that courts should analyze other horizontal restrictions related to the
134
venture under the rule of reason.
The Court went on to find that such restraints did not survive scrutiny
under the rule of reason. 135 Nonetheless, the opinion's rationale for
eschewing per se condemnation at the outset pounded another nail into the
coffin of the inhospitality tradition. 136 The opinion did not purport to
overrule Topco and similar decisions, nor did it offer a ringing endorsement
of such decisions. Instead, the Court seemed to reserve rule of reason
treatment of such restraints for those instances in which some other
legitimate horizontal cooperation was necessary to further a valid venture.
In the immediate case, that necessary cooperation took the form of
horizontal cooperation on rules of eligibility and salaries paid to student
athletes. The latter, of course, were agreements fixing the price of players'
services. Had the Court deemed these restraints unlawful per se, and thus
not legitimate means of furthering a valid venture, it presumably would
have summarily condemned the restraints before it as well.
The Court's assumption that horizontal fixing of players' salaries could
actually enhance competition and welfare ultimately rested upon a
recognition that reliance upon atomistic rivalry between individual schools
to set "salaries" and eligibility criteria would produce suboptimal results,
because schools would not internalize the impact of their private decisions
137
upon the larger venture because of imperfectly specified property rights.
Thus, no school would adopt proper policies unilaterally, that is, without
assurance that other schools would go along. 138 Put another way, reliance
133. See id.
134. See id. ("[Djespite the fact that this case involves restraints on the ability of member
institutions to compete in terms of price and output, a fair evaluation of their competitive
character requires consideration of the NCAA's justifications for these restraints."); id. at
101 ("[Wlhat is critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.").
135. See id. at 104-20; see also infra notes 181-210 (discussing and critiquing the rule of
reason methodology employed in NCAA).
136. See supranotes 29-31 and accompanying text (describing the inhospitality tradition).
137. See generally Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure,72 Q.J. Econ. 351,
363-65 (1958) (explaining how so-called "ownership externalities" resulting from imperfect
legal institutions will result in market failure).
138. SeeNCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02 ("The identification of this 'product' with an
academic tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor
league baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of the 'product,' athletes must
not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the 'product'
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions
unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed.").
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upon a "competitive" market would result in "market failure" that would
manifest itself in the production and sale of an inferior product.' 39 As a
result, restrictions on horizontal rivalry could actually improve the quality
of the product
offered by the league and thereby enhance consumer
40

welfare. 1

The inhospitality tradition nonetheless earned a reprieve in another
opinion by Justice Stevens:
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society. 14 1 There, the Court evaluated a horizontal agreement between
physicians setting maximum prices. 142 The agreement did not exist in a
vacuum, but was instead ancillary to a joint venture between the same
physicians.1 43 That venture, in turn, offered consumers a so-called prepaid
health plan. Under the plan, the venture agreed to provide physician
services to consumers insured under particular health plans. 144 Thus, the
price agreement between physicians set the maximum price that venture
members would seek to charge consumers insured by participating plans.
Relying on Sylvania and Standard Oil, the defendants argued that their
price-fixing should be analyzed under the rule of reason. In so doing, the
defendants emphasized the special nature of the medical industry and the
145
lack of judicial experience with similar restraints.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, rejected the defendants' efforts to
avoid per se treatment. The Court began by emphasizing that the per se rule
against price-fixing knew no exceptions. 46 Nonetheless, the Court went on
to examine in some detail the defendants' claim that the restriction
produced significant benefits, the possibility of which justified deviation
from per se condemnation.' 47 While the Court recognized that low,
predictable prices would enhance the quality of the venture product, it saw
148
no reason that rival physicians should set such prices.
III. OPEN QUESTIONS
Undoubtedly, Justice Stevens helped contract the scope of the overbroad
per se rule that was "on the books" when he joined the Court. In particular,
Justice Stevens made it clear that some restraints would now survive per se
condemnation whenever a defendant could articulate a plausible benefit
139. See Meese, supra note 20, at 27-28.
140. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102 ("Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college

football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which
might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen consumer
choice-not only the choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletesand hence can be viewed as procompetitive.").
141. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 335.
Id. 339-40.
See id. at 340-41.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 351-56.
Id. at 352-54.
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At the same time, these decisions left some questions

A. What Is the CurrentScope of the Per Se Rule?
The first question is simply doctrinal: Are decisions like Topco and
Seal--which banned outright certain ancillary restraints that appeared
beneficial-still "good law," or did Sylvania, Professional Engineers, and
NCAA overrule these decisions sub silento as some courts and scholars
have suggested? 149 This question is particularly bedeviling given Justice
Stevens's own approving citation of Topco in Maricopa.150 Even more
recently, and after NCAA, the Court cited Topco in a per curiam opinion to
justify application of the per se rule to horizontal restraints. 15 1 This
invocation has led some scholars to opine that Topco, Sealy, and Maricopa
152
are still "good law."'
Still, there is significant authority pointing the other way. To the extent
that Sealy, Topco, and Maricopareflect a judicial allergy to price-fixing or
its equivalent, even maximum price-fixing, all three decisions are now on
shaky ground in light of the more recent unanimous decision in State Oil
Co. v. Khan,1 53 holding that maximum retail price-fixing is analyzed under
the rule of reason. 154 Further, all three predate NCAA, which rejected any
blanket rule against horizontal minimum price-fixing and similar restraints.
To be sure, NCAA purported to confine its more lenient approach to those
instances in which some cooperation between rivals was necessary to
further an otherwise legitimate venture. 155 The opinion could be read to
suggest that this principle distinguished the restraints challenged in NCAA,
on the one hand, from those challenged in Topco, on the other. 156 Indeed,

149. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Easterbrook, J.); see also Chi. Prof 1 Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J.) (finding that an express restriction on output should be evaluated under a
full-blown rule of reason analysis, given the extent of contractual integration between
venture partners).
150. See Maricopa,457 U.S. at 343, 344 n.16.
151. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990). It should be noted that BRG is
distinguishable, insofar as the defendants there did not articulate any market failure
potentially obviated by their cooperation.
152. See Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An
Integrated Handbook 227-30 (2000).
153. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
154. Compare id.at 7, 16-22 (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)),
with Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 347-48 (invoking Albrecht and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951)).
155. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1985).
156. See id.
at 98 n.17, 99 nn.18-19, 100.
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some have argued that Topco survives NCAA at least as a doctrinal matter,
57
and chided those lower courts that have found otherwise. 1
Still, any effort to distinguish Topco from NCAA on these grounds seems
questionable. It is certainly true that the creation and maintenance of a
sports league requires significant, ongoing cooperation between rivals.
Moreover, such cooperation is necessary to create the best possible
product. 158 Much of this type of cooperation would be unlawful per se if
conducted outside the confines of a joint venture. 159 At the same time, one
could make the same observation about the venture in Topco, for instance.
There, after all, horizontal rivals agreed to create a venture that would
produce and distribute numerous new products to all members of the
venture. 160 The creation and maintenance of the venture entailed numerous
and continuous agreements between rivals regarding what sort of products
to offer (and not to offer), the quality of those products, and the price at
which the Topco venture would sell the products to members.161 Moreover,
the venture entailed a continuing agreement among rivals not to sell the
venture's numerous products to those rivals-particularly large national
chains-who were not members of the venture. 162 Each of these numerous
agreements would be unlawful per se if entered by rivals who were not
engaged in otherwise useful cooperation. 16 3 Yet, even the Supreme Court
did not suggest that these restraints or the venture itself was unlawful per
se. 164 Some horizontal cooperation was just as necessary in Topco as it was
in NCAA.

157. See Sullivan & Grimes, supra note 152, at 228-30; Fred S. McChesney, Talking
'Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52
Emory L.J. 1401 (2003).

158. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02.
159. Imagine, for instance, if GM and Ford agreed not to pay assembly-line workers more
than $60,000 per year. Such an agreement, analogous to an agreement not to pay college
players a salary, would be unlawful per se.
160. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1972) ("Topco was
founded in the 1940's by a group of small, local grocery chains, independently owned and
operated, that desired to cooperate to obtain high quality merchandise under private labels in
order to compete more effectively with larger national and regional chains.").
161. See id. at 602-04.
162. Indeed, the whole point of the venture was to create products that would be
exclusive to the members of the venture. In this way, the defendants hoped to create "private
brands" analogous to those sold by the national chains. See id. at 599 & n.3; see also United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596
(1972) (finding that the venture procured and distributed "more than 1000 different food and
related non-food items exclusively to its member chains").
163. For instance, an agreement between Ford and GM not to offer hybrid SUVs would
be unlawful per se. So would an unadorned agreement between these two rivals not to
license proprietary technology to Chrysler.
164. See Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1032 (finding that the venture entailed "the development
of quality specifications and standards, product testing, innovation and quality control...
and negotiation with sources of supply, and product distribution"). Presumably, the venture
also set the price at which it sold its products to members.
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In the end, any effort-intended or not-by the NCAA opinion to
distinguish and preserve the TopcolSealy line of cases does not appear to be
successful. All ventures between actual or potential rivals will almost
certainly involve cooperation between the venture partners that would
otherwise be unlawful per se. Indeed, TCE and its theory of the firm
teaches us that each firm itself is a nexus of contracts-continuing
cooperation between individual owners of labor and property that could
otherwise compete. 165 Indeed, in Maricopa itself, Justice Stevens opined
that price-fixing by a physician joint venture would be "perfectly proper"
because the underlying partnership "is regarded as a single firm competing
with other sellers in the market."' 166 Restraints that accompany the
formation of a unified firm, such as a law firm partnership, would certainly
be analyzed under the rule of reason. 167 As a matter of economic theory,
there is no good reason for treating restrictions that accompany less
168
complete integration any differently.
Taken together, Professional Engineers, NCAA, and Sylvania would
seem to stand for the following general proposition: Restraints-even
restraints between rivals-that accompany otherwise valid contractual
integration avoid per se condemnation, and thus survive, unless condemned
under the rule of reason. One might add the caveat that the defendant must
69
articulate-though not prove-some cognizable benefits of the restraints. 1
This is so even if the restraints under scrutiny involve agreements on price
and/or output, as they did in NCAA. While Maricopa seems to point the
other way, four considerations suggest that the decision is no longer good
law. First, the decision predates NCAA, a more recent statement regarding
the proper treatment of horizontal price-fixing. Second, the decision
garnered the vote of only four Justices-two did not participate, and three
165. See Alan J. Meese, IntrabrandRestraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L.
Rev. 5, 69-73 (2004); see also Chi. Prof I Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.
1996); Bork, supra note 56, at 383-84, 453-54; id at 472 ("In economic analysis, a contract
integration is as much a firm as an ownership integration. The nature of the standards
applied to them through the Sherman Act should be the same." (footnote omitted)).
166. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982).
167. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898)
(Taft, J.), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (noting with approval that "[r]estrictions in the articles
of partnership upon the business activities of the members ... were to be encouraged");
Bork, supra note 56, at 380-84 (explaining why rule of reason treatment is appropriate for
such restraints).
168. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 n.10
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Meese, supra note 20, at 69-73; see also Chi. Profl Sports, 95 F.3d at 598
("The point is that antitrust law permits, indeed encourages, cooperation inside a business
organization the better to facilitate competition between that organization and other
producers."); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994) (analyzing a
refusal to allow a rival to participate in a joint venture that supplied important input under
the rule of reason).
169. See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying
the rule of reason if a restraint arguably "promoted enterprise and productivity at the time it
was adopted").
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dissented.170 Third, the decision rested in significant part upon precedents
such as Albrecht and Kiefer-Stewart, which banned any and all vertical
price-fixing, even price-fixing that resulted in lower prices than the market
would otherwise produce. 17 1 In a unanimous decision joined by Justice
172
Stevens, both decisions were overruled, thus undercutting Maricopa.
Fourth and finally, it does not appear that the defendants in Maricopa
offered the sort of justification for the price restraint that would be deemed
cognizable under Sylvania, ProfessionalEngineers, and NCAA. That is, the
defendants did not explain how unbridled competition could produce a
market failure absent the restraint. 173 Thus, the decision does not really
preclude application of the rule of reason in instances in which defendants
do, in fact, offer such a justification that is cognizable in light of the
principles Justice Stevens embraced in Sylvania, NCAA, and Professional
74
Engineers.1
This is not to say that current law perfectly implements the teachings of
modem economic theory. One can imagine instances in which a particular
restraint overcomes a market failure even though it does not accompany
some larger venture or other set of contractual obligations. Under the law
as just described, such a restraint would be unlawful per se, even if the
defendants could articulate a plausible account of how the restriction
overcomes a market failure. Indeed, Justice Stevens argued as much in his
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics dissent. 175 The Court's
majority disagreed, holding that an agreement between one dealer and a
170. Justices William Brennan, Byron White, and Thurgood Marshall joined the plurality
opinion by Justice Stevens. Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices William Rehnquist
and Lewis Powell dissented. Justices Harry Blackmun and Sandra Day O'Connor did not
participate. Maricopa,457 U.S. at 332.
171. See id. at 346-47.
172. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling Albrecht); see also
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (overruling Kiefer-

Stewart). To be sure, Kiefer-Stewart involved what the Court then defined as horizontal
price-fixing--that is, an agreement between two nominally separate manufacturers to impose
maximum prices on their dealers. 340 U.S. 211, 212 (1951). However, the nominally
separate manufacturers were in fact wholly owned subsidiaries of the same firm. In
Copperweld, the Court overruled Kiefer-Stewart to the extent that it held that such
"cooperation" constituted concerted action and thus fell within § 1 of the Sherman Act. 467
U.S. at 771. Under current law, the conduct analyzed in Kiefer-Stewart would be lawful per
se under Copperweld. Concerted vertical maximum price-fixing would be subject to rule of
reason treatment.
173. See Wesley J. Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments:
Horizontal Restrictions, Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1019, 1034
(1986) ("Unfortunately, the defendants never offered any plausible explanation of how the
maximum prices contributed to the efficiency of the insurance plans.").
174. See supra notes 84-87, 112-20, 128-34 and accompanying text; see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 886, 893-98 (1981) (articulating
other possible legitimate rationales for the maximum price-fixing in Maricopa); Liebeler,
supra note 173, at 1035 (contending that the maximum price-fixing in Maricopa could
prevent opportunistic gouging by physicians).
175. 485 U.S. 717, 736-58 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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manufacturer to terminate a price cutter was a vertical non-price restraint,
even though there was no additional agreement between the manufacturer
176
and the remaining dealer regarding any service obligations by the latter.
Justice Stevens dissented for this very reason, arguing that the restraint
could not be "ancillary" and thus beyond per se condemnation, because
there were no accompanying contractual obligations. 177 That is to say, he
could not see how the agreement to terminate a price-cutting dealer
overcame a failure in the market for promotional services, given the
absence of any express contractual requirement that the remaining dealer
provide such services. 178 While the Court rejected Justice Stevens's
argument in this non-price, vertical context, the179current law regarding
horizontal restraints would be more receptive to it.
B. Rule of Reason Methodology
Relaxation of the per se rule against numerous vertical and horizontal
restraints required courts to develop a methodology for analyzing such
restraints under the rule of reason. During the inhospitality era, the
Supreme Court had no occasion to articulate such standards, busy as it was
declaring additional categories of conduct unlawful per se. Indeed, when
the Court described the rule of reason in Sylvania, the best it could do was
quote a standard announced just after World War I and then refer in passing
to an inconsistent requirement that triers of fact "balance" a restraint's
0
anticompetitive harms against any procompetitive benefits.18
176. See id. at 725-35.
177. Compare id. at 739-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) with id. at 729 n.3 (contending that a
restraint could be ancillary to the sale of a chattel).
178. Thus, Justice Stevens echoed the conclusions of two noted economists that minimum
resale price maintenance cannot itself induce promotional efforts, absent some enforced
requirement that dealers engage in efforts desired by the manufacturer. See Benjamin Klein
& Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. &
Econ. 265 (1988). I have taken issue with Klein and Murphy's argument that intrabrand
restraints are necessarily designed to operate as performance bonds that facilitate a
manufacturer's effort to induce its dealers to engage in certain forms of promotion. See Alan
J. Meese, Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 553 (2004)
(contending that intrabrand restraints confer property rights on dealers and therefore
facilitate the decentralization of promotional decision making).
179. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (condemning a
restraint, under the "quick look" intermediate inquiry, that arguably combated free riding but
was imposed by parties after the formation of a legitimate venture). But see United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the trial court should have analyzed an
agreement amongst various elite universities on the size of financial awards-a non-ancillary
restraint-under the rule of reason).
180. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,49 n.15 (1977) (quoting Bd.
of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)); see also id at 57 n.27
(characterizing rule of reason analysis as "balancing" a restraint's anticompetitive impact
against any procompetitive benefits). It should be noted that Justice Brandeis's opinion in
Chicago Board of Trade does not refer to balancing, which is a modem construct where
antitrust is concerned.
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Justice Stevens's opinion in NCAA contains the most complete modem
explication of rule of reason methodology by the Supreme Court. Having
declined to condemn the challenged restraints as unlawful per se, the Justice
went on to evaluate the restrictions under the rule of reason. 18 1 In so doing,
Justice Stevens was basically writing on a blank slate, and he articulated a
mode of analysis that was not entirely consistent with his prior articulation
of the relationship between restraining contracts and useful competition.
He began by calling attention to the district court's findings that the
restraints in question had resulted in higher prices and reduced outputmeasured as the bare number of games-compared to the results that a
more "competitive" market would have produced.1 82 These findings, he
said, gave rise to a presumption that the restraints were unreasonableindeed, "the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman
Act was intended to prohibit."' 183 As a result, he said, the defendants bore a
"heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense."' 184
Echoing
Professional Engineers, Justice Stevens explained that such a defense
would have to "competitively justif[y] this apparent deviation from the
185
operations of a free market."
In shifting the burden to defendants in this manner, the Court expressly
rejected the contention that the plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie
case because they had not proved that the defendants possessed power in a
properly defined relevant market. 186 This "market power filter" argument
had an impressive pedigree. First advocated by Robert Bork, the test found
subsequent followers in Richard Posner as well as Frank Easterbrook, the
counsel for the defendants on appeal.' 87 Each had argued, with great force,
that courts should require plaintiffs to establish the boundaries of a relevant
market, as well as the defendants' share of that market, when challenging
horizontal ancillary restraints under the rule of reason. Absent such power,
the defendants could not harm consumers, even if they were attempting to
do so. It therefore made sense to understand such cooperation as benign or

181. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1985).
182. See id. at 104-05.
183. See id. at 107-08 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52-60
(1911)).

184. See id. at 113 ("[T]he NCAA television plan on its face constitutes a restraint upon
the operation of a free market, and the findings of the District Court establish that it has
operated to raise prices and reduce output. Under the [r]ule of [r]eason, these hallmarks of
anticompetitive behavior place upon petitioner a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative
defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a free
market.").
185. Id.

186. See id. at 109 (recounting this argument by the defendants).
187. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 165-66 (1976)
(arguing that ancillary restraints should be lawful absent proof that parties to the restraint
have market power); Robert H. Bork, supra note 56; Easterbrook, supra note 72.

1800

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

even beneficial. 188 After all, it was said, mergers also eliminated
competition between parties to the transaction, and yet courts required some
definition of the relevant market and calculation of the defendants' share
before presuming such a transaction unlawful. 189 Relying upon Professor
Ronald Coase's theory of the firm, these scholars argued that partial
contractual integration, including ancillary restraints such as those
scrutinized in Sealy and Topco, could also produce significant efficiencies
by reducing the cost of transacting and overcoming market failure. 190 Thus,
they concluded, a plaintiffs failure to establish market power should doom
its case.
Justice Stevens brushed aside the defendants' call for a market power
filter with little ado. For one thing, he said, the Court had never required
proof of market power before condemning such "naked" restraints, which,
on their face, expressly limited price and output. 191 This was an accurate
statement of then-existing case law, with the possible exception of Justice
Brandeis's famous opinion in Chicago Board of Trade.192 On the other
hand, this case law consisted entirely or almost entirely of decisions
condemning horizontal restraints as unlawful per se, thereby precluding rule
of reason analysis in the first place. 193 Thus, they formed an uncertain basis
for articulating and defining rule of reason analysis. Turning from
precedent to economics, the Justice invoked the views of the Solicitor
General and Professor Phillip Areeda, both of whom contended that courts
conducting rule of reason analysis could condemn horizontal restraints
without proof that the defendants have market power. 194 Both authorities
argued that, regardless of proof of the relevant market and market power,
proof that a restraint reduces output and/or increases prices should suffice to
establish a prima facie case. 195 In particular, the Solicitor General claimed
that proof of the relevant market and calculation of defendants' shares
therein were simply one means "by which the effects of the conduct on the
market place can be assessed."' 96 Thus, proof that a restraint had actually
reduced output or increased prices was simply an alternate-and more
188. See Easterbrook, supra note 72, at 19-23; see also Posner, supra note 187, at 165-66;
Bork, supra note 56, at 389-90.
189. See Bork, supra note 56, at 384 (explaining and relying upon a merger analogy).
190. See Posner, supra note 187, at 165-66; Bork, supra note 56, at 380-84, 430-52;
Easterbrook, supra note 64, at 1-2, 4-9.
191. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1985).
192. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1918) (relying in part
on the absence of market power to find ancillary price restraint reasonable).
193. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110 n.41 (citing Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 30910 (1956); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940)). None of
these cases involved restraints that accompanied otherwise legitimate ventures.
194. SeeNCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39, 110 n.42 (discussing and quoting these authorities).
195. See id.at 109 n.39 (describing an argument to this effect by Professor Areeda); id.at
110 n.42 (describing an argument to this effect by the Solicitor General).
196. See id.at 110 n.42 (quoting the Solicitor General's brief).
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direct-method of proving that the restraints had a harmful impact. 197
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded, "[t]his naked restraint on price and output
requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed
1 98
market analysis."'
Lower courts, scholars, and enforcers have read this language in a variety
of ways. Many agree that proof that a restraint results in higher prices
and/or reduced output suffices to establish a prima facie case. 199 These
authorities reason that firms could not alter price or output without market
power, so that proof that a restraint has had such an impact thereby
establishes the existence of market power "directly." '200 Some have even
suggested that such direct proof is superior to more traditional methods of
establishing market power, because the demonstration of a relevant market
and calculation of market shares is merely "indirect" proof of such
power. 20 1 The Supreme Court itself endorsed such an approach just two
years after NCAA, in FTC v. IndianaFederationof Dentists:
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market
power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition, "proof of actual detrimental
effects, such as a reduction of output," can obviate the need for an inquiry
202
into market power, which is but a "surrogate for detrimental effects."
The enforcement agencies and numerous scholars have also endorsed such
20 3
an approach.
Some authorities have gone even further, holding or suggesting that
plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case simply by proving the mere
existence of a restraint that purports to govern price and output. 20 4 Under

197. See id. ("[A] judgment about market power is the means by which the effects of the
conduct on the market place can be assessed, [and] market power is only one test of
'reasonableness.' And where the anticompetitive effects of conduct can be ascertained
through means short of extensive market analysis, and where no countervailing competitive
virtues are evident, a lengthy analysis of market power is not necessary.").
198. See id. at 110.
199. Mark Patterson has collected and analyzed these authorities. See Mark R. Patterson,
The Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A RhetoricalHistory, 37
San Diego L. Rev. 1 (2000).
200. See 7 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of
Antitrust Principles and Their Application 380, 1507 (2000) (discussing various methods
of establishing the existence of a prima facie case, such as alternate vehicles of establishing
possession and use of market power).
201. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) (claiming that "an actual
adverse effect on competition. . . arguably is more direct evidence of market power than
calculations of elusive market share figures"); Patterson, supra note 199, at 39.
202. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (White, J.) (quoting 7
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 200, at 429 1511).
203. See, e.g., DOJ Antitrust Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.3.
204. See, e.g., id. § 3.31(b); see also Chi. Prof I Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674
(7th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e understand [NCAA] as holding that any agreement to reduce output
measured by the number of televised games requires some justification-some explanation

1802

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

this so-called "quick look" approach, proof that the parties have entered
such a restraint immediately casts upon the defendants the burden of
adducing evidence that a restraint produces some cognizable benefit. 20 5

Defendants' failure to offer such proof dooms the restraint. The Supreme
Court's most recent statement on the rule of reason, occurring in dicta,
2
adopts this reading of NCAA. 06
While each of these approaches is supported by considerable logic, I have
previously argued that neither is justified, and that courts and enforcement
agencies should employ the sort of market power filter that then-Professor
Bork advocated four decades ago. 20 7 Moreover, after reconsidering
Professional Engineers and NCAA-the supposed bases for these
shortcuts-I must confess that my mind is unchanged. Indeed, I am not so
sure that Justice Stevens himself would embrace tests that others have
derived from his opinions, given the deeper logic of Professional
Engineers, Sylvania, and NCAA.
As explained earlier, Professional Engineers, Sylvania, and NCAA all
reject perfect competition as the proper framework for evaluating restraints
under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 208 These decisions recognize that some
restraints-even horizontal restraints-can sometimes overcome the sort of
market failures that unbridled rivalry would otherwise produce. As
Sylvania put it, in the real world, some restraints can actually improve upon
the results of "pure competition." 20 9 According to Justice Stevens, then,
restrictions that avoid per se condemnation do so precisely because they
2 10
may improve upon the results that atomistic rivalry would produce.
Consider now the two alternatives to the market power filter: the "quick
look" and the "direct effects test." Each takes as a baseline the resultsnamely, price and output-that unbridled markets would have produced.
More precisely, each treats that baseline as reflecting prices and output that

connecting the practice to consumers' benefits-before the court attempts an analysis of
market power.").
205. See Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd., 961 F.2d at 674-75; DOJ Antitrust Collaboration
Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.3.
206. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (stating that the burden
shifts to the defendants when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets" (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459;
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1985); Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
207. See Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content
of the Rule of Reason, 68 Antitrust L.J. 461 (2000) (contending that the mere existence of
express restraint on price should not give rise to a prima facie case); Meese, supra note 10, at
145-61 (arguing that mere proof that a restraint results in higher prices should not give rise to
a prima facie case).
208. See supra notes 84-87, 112-20, 128-34 and accompanying text.
209. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-56 (1977); see also
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02.
210. See Meese, supra note 10, at 141-44.
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are presumptively efficient. Efforts to depart from these baselinesparticularly successful efforts-are therefore presumptively suspect under
either test and give rise to a primafacie case against the restraint.
This logic would be compelling only if one could assume that unbridled
markets-atomistic competition-generally produced efficient results in the
real world. If this were the case, then it would make sense to presume that
departures from the atomistic results reflect anticompetitive harm. There is,
however, no reason to entertain this rather heroic assumption. Indeed, our
everyday experience rebuts it. For instance, just about every industry has
firms. 2 11 By definition, the firm entails the direction of some economic

2 12
decisions by fiat and thus a departure from perfect competition.
Moreover, we now know that the existence of firms generally reflects a
determination by individual economic actors that atomistic rivalry will
entail unnecessary costs of production. 2 13 In other words, the ubiquity of
firms reflects the ubiquity of bargaining and information costs that would
result in a market failure. 2 14 Indeed, as Justice Stevens said in Maricopa,
price-fixing between individuals associated within firms is "perfectly
2 15
proper."
At the same time, we also know that the firm is simply one species of
contract, and that many other "non-standard" contracts can overcome
market failure. 2 16 We also observe these contracts every day in industries
where the proponents of the agreements have little or no "market power."
That, of course, was the point of Justice Stevens's implicit rejection of
perfect competition as an appropriate benchmark in ProfessionalEngineers.
Given the ubiquity of market failure, it seems equally safe to assume that
most partial contractual integration also reflects efforts to overcome market
2 17
failure and reduce the cost of transactions.
If most real-world markets are prone to fail, then there is no particular
reason to presume that unbridled competition in a given market will
produce efficient prices or levels of output, at least as courts measure these
variables. Moreover, theory-as well as Sylvania and NCAA-teach us that

211. Indeed, Professor Ronald Coase has gone even further, asserting that most economic
activity takes place within firms. See Coase, supra note 63, at 714 ("[M]ost resources in a
modem economic system are employed within firms."); see also 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp,
supra note 200, at 236
1464c (noting that "conspiracies among unrelated units are
relatively infrequent" compared to those that take place within individual firms).
212. See Coase, supra note 64, at 389 & n.3 (explaining how, in a competitive system,
there is an "'optimum' amount of planning").
213. See generally Coase, supra note 63.
214. Cf Coase, supra note 74, at 26 (contending that the widespread presence of
transaction costs makes externalities "ubiquitous").
215. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982).
216. See Steven N. S. Cheung, The ContractualNature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & Econ. 1
(1983); Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basisfor the Firm, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 181 (1988).

217. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 28 (1985)
(concluding that there is a "rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting
have efficiency purposes").
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some market failures produce prices that are too low, and output that is too
high. So, for instance, dealer free riding that results in suboptimal
promotion of a manufacturer's product will result in demand, and prices,
that are too low. Moreover, unbridled scheduling by college football
programs may result in "output" (the number of games played) that is too
high, in that too many games will remove the "student" from "student
athletes." 2 18 Restraints that overcome these market failures
will result in
2 19
higher prices in one case, and reduced output in the other.
As a result, where the defendants avoid per se treatment by plausibly
contending that a restraint will overcome a market failure, courts
conducting rule of reason analysis must focus on the type of market failure
avoided and tailor their analysis accordingly. It is not enough to ask-as
courts and agencies now do-whether a restraint raises prices or lowers
output simpliciter and then to condemn any such increase in price or
reduction in output. In some instances, such proof is equally consistent
with the defendants' argument-the argument that avoids per se
treatment-that the restraint overcomes a market failure. 220 In such cases,
the deeper logic of NCAA, ProfessionalEngineers, and Sylvania requires
dismissal of the case absent at least some additional proof suggesting that
the price increase or output reduction flows from an exercise of market
power and not from a correction of market failure. Absent such proof, any
presumption that the restraint is a result of market power finds no support in
economic theory and thus must be rejected. 22 1 The only such evidence that
218. Cf NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1985)
(explaining how horizontal cooperation between rivals was necessary to ensure that
participants remained true amateurs).
219. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
Antitrust L.J. 135, 156 (1984) ("Every restricted dealing arrangement is designed to
influence price. It must be. If territorial limits induce dealers to supply additional service
and information, they do so only because they raise the price and thus call forth competition
in the service dimension .... Every argument about restricted dealing implies that the
restrictions influence price. There is no such thing as a free lunch; the manufacturer can't
get the dealer to do more without increasing the dealer's margin." (footnote omitted));
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
282, 284 (1975); see also William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine,
75 Cal. L. Rev. 933, 945-46 (1987) ("Higher retail prices are entirely consistent with the
benign explanation of resale price maintenance. Imposition of [resale price maintenance]
reflects a judgment on the part of the brand owner that her products will compete more
successfully, both against other branded products and against generic rivals, if the retailer
competes along parameters other than price. And the retailer's expenses of engaging in
those other forms of rivalry are financed by setting a retail margin higher than would prevail
if retail price competition were allowed or encouraged.")
220. See Meese, supra note 10, at 145-61.
221. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-95 (1986)
(noting that evidence that is as consistent with procompetitive as with anticompetitive
objectives cannot, without more, support an inference of anticompetitive conduct); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-64 (1984) (same); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz.
v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 279-80 (1968) (same); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v.
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seems to satisfy this test would be proof of market power.222 Similar
reasoning calls into question statements in NCAA and Professional
Engineers that a justification that 223
presumes increased prices cannot be
cognizable under the rule of reason.
This is not to say that NCAA was wrongly decided on its particular facts.
The Court may well have reached the proper result despite articulating an
overall methodology that would be flawed if applied to other cases. Indeed,
one could even argue that the Court was too generous to the defendants.
After all, the Court employed the rule of reason simply because some other
horizontal cooperation was justified, and not because the defendants
necessarily articulated a market failure that the restraints on price and
output would plausibly overcome. In fact, parts of the Court's rule of
reason analysis entail a determination that at least some of the defendants'
224
purported justifications were simply not cognizable in the first place.
The realization that the NCAA defendants may not have offered any
cognizable justifications gives rise to the following thought experiment.
How would Justice Stevens have treated a claim that horizontal restrictions
225
would overcome a well-recognized market failure, such as free riding?

Would he have found a prima facie case based solely upon proof that the
restriction resulted in higher prices? Or would he have followed the advice
of Judges Easterbrook, Bork, and Posner, and required some showing of
market power? Taken to its logical conclusion, the deeper logic of NCAA
and ProfessionalEngineers would, I submit, require the latter approach.
C. Cognizability
The final and perhaps most difficult question is, what sort of benefits are
cognizable under the rule of reason? Put another way, when do such
benefits reflect the elimination or attenuation of market failure and thus
reflect efforts to enhance "competitive conditions"? Or, in the alternate,
when does an asserted justification simply reflect an argument that
"competition is itself unreasonable"? After all, all such restraints restrict
and reduce "competition."
Taken together, Justice Stevens's various decisions seem to point to the
following distinction. On the one hand there are those restrictions that
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on
formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust
law.").
222. See Meese, supra note 10, at 145-62.
223. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-94 (1978).
224. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 116-17 (1985)
(dismissing the argument that broadcasting limits were necessary to protect live attendance
for the "fundamental" reason that this justification depended upon the argument that
"competition itself [was] unreasonable" (quoting Prof'lEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 696)).
225. See, e.g., Chi. Prof'I Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that
output restrictions avoided per se treatment where defendants argued that such restrictions
would overcome free riding).
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rearrange the institutional framework within which parties compete, so as to
ensure that parties internalize the costs and benefits of their actions. Such
restrictions perform the very same function as the law of property, which
itself helps further useful "competition. '226 By better aligning the interests
of economic actors and the rest of society, such restrictions enhance the
results produced by "competition." 227 The classic example-and one
expressly invoked in ProfessionalEngineers-would be a covenant not to
compete ancillary to the sale of a business. By ensuring that an owner can
reap the full value of its business at the time of sale, such restraints perfect
incentives for presale efforts to invest in and enhance the business, thereby
2 28
improving the results produced by presale rivalry.
On the other hand, there are those restrictions that make no effort to alter
a market's background rules or the incentives that market actors face.
Instead, such restraints prevent certain market outcomes, and encourage
others, because such outcomes are supposedly the result of a market failure.
The most salient example here would be the ban on competitive bidding
scrutinized in ProfessionalEngineers. The ban, it is said, prevented an
inferior market outcome, namely, shoddy engineering work at a low
price. 2 29 Such a ban rested upon the assumption that consumers of
engineers' services-who possess every incentive to make optimal
purchasing decisions-possessed imperfect information about the trade-off
between the price of such services and their quality.
Still, the distinction just described does not quite capture the boundary
between cognizable justifications on the one hand, and mere restrictions on
competition on the other. There are, after all, some justifications that do not
involve alterations in the institutional framework as such but instead entail
contractual limits upon the outcomes of market processes. For instance, the
amateurism rules tacitly approved in NCAA did not alter the institutional
framework as such, but instead set the price to be paid to athletes. Other
such legitimate restrictions would set output. 2 30 Yet, according to Justice
226. See Hayek, supra note 74, at 110-11 ("That a functioning market presupposes not
only prevention of violence and fraud but the protection of certain rights, such as property,
and the enforcement of contracts, is always taken for granted."); Wesley J. Liebeler,
Exclusion and Efficiency, 11 Reg. 34, 38-39 (1987) (asserting that productive competition
depends upon creation and enforcement of property rights).
227. See Coase, supra note 63, at 717-18 (arguing that the background structure of legal
entitlements can affect the nature of economic activity and thus allocation of resources).
228. Trebilcock, supra note 107, at 252-53 ("A restrictive covenant enables the owner of
a business in effect to capitalize the benefits of expected returns from investment in
goodwill, for example, trade secrets, specialized know-how, or customer connections, in the
sale price of a business by creating limited property rights in these assets in the purchaser
that protect him from reappropriation of those assets by the vendor.").
229. In the same way, the defendants in United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658,
665 (3d Cir. 1993), argued that competition among Ivy League schools when determining
financial aid packages would deprive the schools of sufficient resources to provide enough
aid to students who enhanced the socioeconomic diversity of entering classes.
230. For instance, a college sports league might place limits on the number of games its
members could play in any given year.
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Stevens, proponents of such restraints could avoid per se treatment by
arguing that such limits enhanced the quality of the product the league
offered. In the same way, one could argue, the ban on competitive bidding
by engineers could enhance the quality of engineering services offered by
participants in the agreement.
In the end, then, it appears that cognizability-at least according to
Justice Stevens-turns on the source of the market failure that a restraint is
addressing. Where the purported failure flows from a poor assignment of
property rights and resulting misalignment of incentives, courts will
entertain arguments that a contractual restraint will redescribe such property
rights or, in the alternative, produce economic results that better
approximate those that a well-functioning market would produce. On the
other hand, where such failure stems from high information costs, and
consumers' inability to perceive their own interests, (paternalistic) restraints
that interfere with consumer choices in an otherwise competitive market
will be unlawful per se.
The distinction between benefits that are cognizable, on the one hand,
and those that are not, is not inevitable or set in stone. There is, at the same
time, something to be said for it. Whether the distinction will hold up over
2 31
time, of course, still remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

Justice Stevens joined the Supreme Court at the height of the
inhospitality era, during which courts had enforced a modified version of
atomistic competition under the aegis of the antitrust laws. As the Court's
leading antitrust voice, he played a crucial role in reforming antitrust
doctrine to reflect a more sophisticated conception of competition, a
conception that recognized the role of non-standard contracts in overcoming
market failure. Antitrust law and the consumers it serves are all better off
because of the efforts of this thoughtful jurist.

231. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 US 756 (1999) (finding that the restraint that
purportedly overcame market failure caused by consumer ignorance was properly analyzed
under rule of reason).
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